

Statement by David Nelson Rowe, Professor of Political Science at Yale University and Member, National Advisory Board, The Committee for A Free China, before the Temporary Committee on Resolutions, Republican National Convention, August 14, 1972.

Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge with thanks the opportunity of presenting our views on one of the most important foreign policy areas in which the United States is involved, Eastern Asia.

My name is David Nelson Rowe, and I am Professor of Political Science at Yale University and a Member of the National Advisory Board of The Committee for a Free China. As our name indicates, the objective of this Committee is the restoration of freedom to the long-suffering peoples of China, and, under freedom, their full participation in the world we live in today.

Recent initiatives of our own government aimed at drawing the people of China into the international community of our day, while fraught with hazards, must, in principle, secure our wholehearted support. In practice, however, the risks are so great that our approach must be reserved and partial, and it has been, thus far. The chief problem is that the Communist regime in the Chinese mainland is today so generally unstable, and enjoys such a constantly declining measure of public support among its own people, that any effort to reach the Chinese people through it are almost certainly doomed to failure, certainly in the short run.

To disregard these facts, and to persist in any belief that in reaching out toward the regime of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching we are getting in touch with valid representatives of the great Chinese people, would be to merely endanger the cause of freedom, and not to enhance it.

The constantly swelling numbers of young Chinese from behind the "bamboo curtain" who risk their lives each day to escape from the Chinese mainland to the outside world in search of freedom, is a testimony to the growing disillusionment of the Chinese people with their Red masters. The purely physical hazards of trying to

flee from China's mainland today are so severe that almost all escapees are youths. Their elders for the most part cannot succeed in swimming to freedom. Besides, it is the young who have ahead of them the longest prospect of life in the Red Chinese hell on earth, and who therefore have the strongest motivations for risking danger to escape. The number of dead bodies, many riddled with bullets, picked up in the waters around Hongkong, is an ample indication of what these dangers are.

Recent initiatives of the Chinese Communist regime to diminish slightly their previous isolation vis-a-vis the Free World have been based heavily on their own recognition of the dangers facing them internally, and a desire on their part to ameliorate them by tactical maneuvers designed to enhance their prestige in the world at large. It is entirely accurate to say that none of these new tactical devices have in any way or to any real extent altered their basic strategy of doing everything they can to destroy freedom everywhere it exists and to make over the world in their own Marxist, Leninist, Maoist image. World revolution everywhere is their openly stated aim, even while they sit in the United Nations and receive the President of the United States and his staff members in consultations in Peking.

Their basic strategic aim of revolutionizing the world along Communist lines and of destroying freedom everywhere in the process, is fully shared with them by the Soviet Union. This is true, no matter what the differences are between Communist China and the USSR as to doctrine, power in the Communist world, or details of tactics which should best be followed by these two partners in crime in order to destroy us and everything we believe in. This is a fundamental fact of life, which has to regulate our behavior at every step of the way when we talk with, negotiate with, or merely exchange views with, any Communist country. Our efforts to possibly exploit the differences between them, by what is known as playing the "balance of power game" must take place only on our side with a constant consciousness of the basic fact that the very words we use in such conversations mean one thing to us, and very, very different things to Communists. The dangers inherent in such a situation

must be clearly apparent to any thinking person.

There is also the danger that in trying to better our position vis-a-vis the Russians or the Chinese Communists we may fall into the trap not only of sacrificing our own vital interests, but those of our friends and loyal allies.

The Republican Party cannot, and must not, in my opinion, stand for abandoning our loyal allies. It cannot, and must not, in my opinion, stand for breaking our word, formally pledged in treaties and agreements with other nations.

I urge upon the Republican Party that at this time, there is nothing more important for the United States of America than a pledge to faithfully fulfill our commitments to our loyal allies, whether in Asia, Europe or elsewhere.

We have many such loyal allies. In the Far East they include Japan, The Republic of Korea, The Republic of China, The Republic of the Philippines, and the Republic of South Vietnam, to mention only some of them.

The position of the Administration of President Nixon in respect to these allies and friends cannot be mistaken. It has been publicly proclaimed over and over again. It is a policy of faithfully fulfilling our commitments to our loyal allies.

Time does not allow me to detail these commitments here. Of primary importance, however, to the some 50,000 members and supporters of the Committee for a Free China, are our commitments to The Republic of China and its people. We have been, and are now, sustaining at least three different commitments to The Republic of China. These are:

- (1) The continuation of diplomatic recognition and full diplomatic relations between the ROC and the USA;
- (2) The continuation of the mutual security relations between the USA and the ROC which are embodied in the treaty of 1955 between the two countries, and in subsequent inter-government arrangements;
- (3) The continuation of, and the enhancement of, the mutual economic, cultural scientific and people-to-people relationships between the ROC and the USA.

There are those who assert that the Republican Administration in Washington,

by entering into conversations with the Red Chinese, has cast a death penalty upon these relationships with The Republic of China.

There are others who say that what is widely termed the "Nixon Doctrine" of 1969 will soon bring an end to all American pledges of military responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

In my opinion, and in the opinion of The Committee for a Free China, neither of these assertions can be upheld.

To those who doubt the full measure of friendly diplomatic relationships between The Republic of China and the United States of America I say: "Go to Free China and see for yourselves." In the last eight months I have visited The Republic of China twice, and from a perspective of nearly forty years of professional study of Chinese Affairs I can tell you that the friendly relations between our two countries have never been more prosperous. This is true not only of diplomatic relations, but with the entire structure of substantive relations in business and economics, scientific and technical collaboration, and pure people-to-people relations that it is the mission of diplomacy to facilitate and advance.

But what of the vital area of military security? Does the Nixon pledge to gradually withdraw American military personnel from the ROC as peace and stability are established in the whole general region of East Asia mean a genuine diminution of our lawful and proper concern for the military security of The Republic of China? It is at this point quite logical to ask how, in the name of common sense, we could succeed in enhancing our mutual economic prosperity, for instance, without being able and willing to provide for our mutual military security. Would the important American business firms who are investing millions in The Republic of China in the legitimate pursuit of mutual profits, do so if they were really convinced that all logical steps toward military security in the area were not being taken?

Does the "Nixon Doctrine" of 1969 really mean the destruction of the system of military security in the western Pacific and Far East that has served us so well since the end of World War II? I submit that it means nothing of the kind. The "Nixon Doctrine" is merely an expression of the changing realities that have evolved in East Asia since 1945. It states in general that in view of these realities, and in particular the growing ability of our East Asian allies to contribute to their own defense, the nature of U. S. military involvement will change. It will decreasingly emphasize the involvement of large numbers of American ground troops for the defense of security, and increasingly emphasize strategic defense. Hence the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war in Southeast Asia, a successful policy to be sure, but one that still has a long way to go. "Vietnamization", we should remember, has already been preceded by "Koreanization", but the job of Koreanization, although it has gone on for about twenty years, is not absolutely complete yet today. Those who are impatient with the pace of "Vietnamization" of the war in Southeast Asia should remember this.

Seen in this way, and with the increasing economic and technical capabilities of The Republic of China to provide for its own defense, the Nixon Doctrine does not in any way mean the cessation of our interest in the strategic defense of The Republic of China. But if we are to increasingly withdraw our own force-components from the territories of our allies in East Asia, we must increasingly augment the modernization of their own defense forces. "Vietnamization" or "Koreanization" does not mean relegating to our allies merely the remnants of our own obsolescent or semi-obsolescent weapons. And this is nowhere more important than in the field of airpower. Recent Department of Defense programs and proposals for the allocation of modern aircraft to the defense forces of our allies in East Asia should be backed with the full support not only of the Republican Administration but of the Republican Party.

Finally, I must say that while economic cooperation between allies and friends

of the United States in East Asia and ourselves does require a sound structure of mutual security, the reverse is also true. Namely, for the "Nixon Doctrine" to succeed in its valid aim of increasing the effective contribution by our allies in East Asia to their own defense and security requires the continual economic development of these nations in the Far East so their citizens can really help themselves to defend their own security and the general peace.

A balance between economic power and its uses for the enhancement of security is not always easy to secure. This, in my opinion, is particularly important in respect to Japan today. The redress of the current imbalance in these areas in Japan should, I urge strongly, be one of the most important tasks of American diplomacy. Having helped in a very large way by our own post-war policies toward Japan, and by consistently opening our own markets and resources to that country, we are, it seems to me, in a position today to make effective in respect to the Japanese government a policy of drastically increasing the self-defense capacity of the Japanese nation, while still maintain^{ing} a mutuality in our security agreements and arrangements that has been one of the great successes of our post-war diplomacy in East Asia.

I close by stating again my appreciation to the Temporary Committee on Resolutions and to this Subcommittee VII for allowing me to address it on behalf of The Committee for A Free China. May I say that for about three years before 1968 I was Vice Chairman of the Task Force on Conduct of Foreign Relations of the Republican Coordinating Committee, and that during the 1968 Presidential Campaign I was National Co-Chairman of Scholars for Nixon-Agnew, an organization of the Republican Campaign Committee.