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STATEMENT TO THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMMITTEE

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BUILDING A NEW RATIONALE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING

I very much appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the Arms Control Association on arms control and disarmament to the Platform Committee of the Republican National Committee.

President Nixon and his SALT negotiators deserve the warmest congratulations and commendation for the achievement of the Treaty Limiting Antiballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement Limiting Offensive Arms. These initial accomplishments are of very little value, however, if they are not reinforced by serious efforts to find agreement with the Soviet Union on far more extensive arms limitations than have yet been negotiated. But success in SALT II negotiations will require more than the support of the American people. It will depend in good measure on the willingness of all Americans, government officials and public alike, to pursue a goal of international peace and security through arms limitations and eventual nuclear disarmament in an atmosphere of restraint, free from false or exaggerated cries of alarm about threats to national security that can only be countered by expanded arms building. Unhappily, such an unproductive atmosphere now seems to be developing. It does a grave disservice to the painstaking efforts of President Nixon's SALT I negotiators, it seriously undermines the prospect that their achievements will have any lasting effect, and it makes doubly difficult the work of the men who will be attempting the far more difficult task of negotiating the next round.

In this context, the Arms Control Association is presenting a number of recommendations on strategic nuclear arms control which I respectfully urge the Platform Committee to include in its plank on national security policy.

There are four general considerations which underly these recommendations:

-- first, we support the Moscow accords on their face;

-- second, to facilitate successful negotiation of future limitations on strategic armaments, we urge an immediate halt to those weapons programs, both underway and in planning stages, which are unnecessary, dangerous, and wasteful;

-- third, we support the continuation of weapons programs which will enhance international stability and preserve the deterrent.

-- finally, we urge that in developing national security planning, careful attention be given to working within a framework which gives as great consideration to arms control as it gives to arms procurement.

Our recommendations are as follows:

1. Support for the ratification without reservation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles;

2. Support for the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;

3. Rejection of any conditions to such ratification or support, in particular the commitment of the Congress to support any new strategic weapons programs as an element of the ratification process.

4. The commitment of the United States to negotiate in good faith the further limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, including:

- a. the elimination of all antiballistic missile deployments;
- b. the control and limitation of Multiple, Independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) through negotiated limitation of missile flight tests and the immediate cessation of US MIRV deployment.
- c. the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;
- d. the negotiation of selective restrictions on antisubmarine warfare techniques, to assure prolonged invulnerability of the sea-based deterrent.
- e. the negotiated reduction of numbers of bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and forward-based systems;
- f. the negotiated reduction of ground forces based overseas including the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in the hands of such forces.

5. Immediate cessation of the following weapons procurement programs:

- a. TRIDENT submarine and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles;
- b. B-1 Bombers;

- c. AWACS (air warning and control system)
- d. Programs for improved missile re-entry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs

6. Continued support for the Polaris/Poseidon SLBM program, and for research and development of an improved single-warhead replacement missile for the Poseidon missile.

7. Adoption of a declared policy that the United States will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other countries not now possessing them or allied in warfare with a nation possessing them.

8. The reaffirmation of a national objective of a peaceful world through general and complete disarmament, and the immediate adoption of a program for general strategic disarmament as the objective of strategic arms limitation negotiations.

I believe these positions are sound, that they represent reasonable and attainable objectives, and that they are entirely consistent with the attainment of a national security posture that will assure our protection from threat or attack, and pave the way for a more peaceful world in which we can at last refocus our national commitments to the building of a stable and healthy society.

These recommendations are presented against the background of

the observations that follow.

On balance, I believe that the ABM Treaty ~~now before the Senate~~ is a very welcome development, with significant details that will make it more effective; the Interim agreement on offensive weapons, on the other hand, is of considerably less value and may provide incentives for a costly and dangerous qualitative arms race. This is particularly true if it becomes a "hunting license" for a long list of new arms programs to be used as "bargaining chips" for follow-on arms control agreements.

Certainly a most serious shortcoming of the agreement is its failure to control MIRVs -- and apparently there was little or no serious effort to limit them during nearly three years of negotiations. During the time that negotiations were underway, US MIRV deployment was going on at the same time the military was raising alarms about the prospect of a Soviet first strike if the Russians should ever develop their own MIRV capability. MIRVs must be on the shopping list for future negotiations, but I am pessimistic about the prospects for MIRV control in the present atmosphere.

Clearly the Moscow Agreements provide a useful starting point for future improvements: ABMs have probably been effectively stopped, and with them the rational justification for new destabilizing weapons programs. But overshadowing this very important achievement, the atmosphere in which the Treaty and Agreement are being presented to the Congress and the public, and the use of the Interim Agreement as a "hunting license" for new weapons raise serious questions about the prospects for future effective controls.

If the initial accomplishments of SALT I are to turn into more meaningful, real arms control through SALT II negotiations with the Russians and other arms control and disarmament negotiations with other nations, fundamental changes in arms policy must come about.

It's clear that "sufficiency" in arms, which I suppose suggests a policy of restraint, still means "superiority" to military planners and as long as it does, arms control is going to only mean more arms race, and more arms will be bought as "bargaining chips" in a futile effort to bring about their own elimination.

But the evidence is fairly clear that the "bargaining chip" doesn't work. What does work is not the threat of new weapons deployments, but the realization on both sides that a rough parity exists, and an awareness that more of a particular weapon will not mean more safety. That

is what has led to those agreements that have been achieved, and what will prevent agreement on other weapons programs where one side fears the other is way ahead. Thus the one sure way not to get an agreement on MIRVs is for us to forge ahead still further with MIRV deployment and to build Trident submarines laden with more MIRVed missiles.

We have long since passed the point of sanity if we are still obediently following every urging to build more. We are trying to develop nuclear arsenals which will guarantee our ability to kill 100,000,000 Russians, and they are apparently bent on the same objective. But how many Russians do we have to threaten to have a secure deterrent? and how many weapons are necessary to do the job? Surely, if the death of 55,000 Americans over ten years of fighting in Viet Nam has turned this country completely around on the war, it is ludicrous to think that we must threaten 100 million Soviets to deter them.

How did we get to this point? It is clear that our arsenals are swollen far beyond any rational size. To expand them still further is not just excessive, it is madness. Yet that is where the natural pressures that fuel the arms race continue to lead us.

One of the important achievements of SALT for the immediate

future is that by freezing the ABM race the negotiators have institutionalized mutual vulnerability and thereby made permanent mutual deterrence. Thus it is now possible to reassess our real deterrence needs and to find the rationale for an orderly reduction in some arms and the elimination of others to a point where our minimum secure deterrence needs are met.

Whether we can actually do this, however, may depend on whether we can look beyond our immediate objectives. One of the basic reasons, I believe, that our successes at arms building have been so much more imposing than our successes at arms control has been our inability or unwillingness seriously to adopt a long range national security policy that gives arms control and disarmament the same weight that it gives to weapons development and modernization of forces (for which is nearly always meant their expansion). The closest we have ever come to such an approach was in 1962, when we put together a "Blueprint for Peace", a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament. But that was essentially a political document, three-fourths propaganda (at least when seen in hindsight) and hammered out in an adversary negotiation between government agencies. It served the useful purpose of answering the Soviet disarmament propaganda then being put forth at Geneva, but nothing has been heard of it since, and at no other time to my know-

ledge has the United States government formulated and adopted a long-term arms control and disarmament program.

We do so indulge regularly in long range analyses when planning military requirements, however. The longest possible term projections of enemy threats are regularly made, and military forces are designed to meet those threats over the next five, or ten years, or longer. The weapons of the 21st Century are being planned today. But we continue to ad hoc our arms control programs in such a way that we inevitably gear them to meet near-term, serious problems in a piecemeal way, and the use of arms control programs as levers for at best steering the arms race in new directions, rather than putting the brakes on it, is a foregone conclusion.

My recommendation to the Platform Committee, therefore, is to urge the adoption of a long-term national security policy that gives weight as well as lip service to arms control and to disarmament. The 1962 "Blueprint for Peace" may not be the right and realistic formula, but it is worth re-examining it as a basis for developing one that is. For the shorter term, -- and I am talking about the rest of the decade -- we should develop a concrete, step-by-step plan for what I would call "General Strategic Disarmament," a program which would envision the orderly, mutual reduction and elimination of a sizeable part of the nuclear

weapons arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the other nuclear weapons powers.

Such a plan would serve as the basis for future SALT planning; for future negotiations in multilateral forums, such as the CCD in Geneva, and for the future structuring of a rational defense posture. It would pave the way for the far more difficult job of developing the international political structures that will be necessary before general and complete disarmament can be seriously approached.

And it would not allow for the continuing use of arms control negotiations to justify more armaments.

It could mean that the first timid steps taken over the past three years at SALT could lead to the accomplishment of real national security after a generation of tenuous existence under the threat of nuclear annihilation.